King Henry VIII Script
CUNK: Welcome to "Cunk on Negotiation," the show where we learn that people in history were just as bad at talking to each other as we are today. My guest is the original “serial monogamist” with 6 wives to his name, which could be confusing as he’s King Henry VIII.
HENRY VIII: Good morrow, woman.
CUNK: You famously tried to get a divorce from Catherine of Aragon, and the Pope said no. A classic distributive negotiation.
HENRY VIII: Indeed, his Holiness refused my request, leaving me in a right royal conundrum.
CUNK: So, considering the Pope's stubbornness, you pursued your best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), didn’t you?
HENRY VIII: Ah, yes, my BATNA: I created my own church! I couldn’t let the Pope’s refusal leave me with nothing but my wounded pride.
CUNK: So, instead of taking a bad deal, you went for a Pareto-efficient solution?
HENRY VIII: Not quite. I did improve my situation, but it came at a cost to the Pope. He lost authority over England, so it wasn’t truly Pareto-efficient. Just efficient for me.
CUNK: Smart move. But did you consider 3D negotiation before going cold turkey?
HENRY VIII: Sounds like witchcraft!
CUNK: Nah, it’s just clever stuff. Did you try tactics at the table? Like building trust with the Pope?
HENRY VIII: I did send Cardinal Wolsey to try and improve communication and build trust because perhaps I was being too hot-headed, but the Pope was stubborn as an ox.
CUNK: Fair enough. What about the design of the deal?
HENRY VIII: I suppose I should’ve offered more to interest the Pope. Perhaps promising a stronger alliance between England and the Holy Roman Empire.
CUNK: Missed opportunity, mate. What about the setup away from the table?
HENRY VIII: I gave the Pope a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum. “Grant me the annulment… or England walks.” When he refused, I made myself Supreme Head of the Church.
CUNK: So, you flipped the table?
HENRY VIII: Precisely. When a king plays hardball, the stakes are… eternal.
CUNK: So, you didn’t expand the pie of negotiation; you just created a whole new bakery?
HENRY VIII: You could say that.
CUNK: A classic fixed pie, innit?
HENRY VIII: Indeed, but I expanded my options and my marriage bed.
CUNK: Right, but wouldn’t it have been easier to do a bit of logrolling?
HENRY VIII: I suppose the Pope could've had more influence over my future wives. But I was past compromising by then.
CUNK: So no Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA), where both parties’ interests overlap, to work with them?
HENRY VIII: None whatsoever. Our ZOPA was the palace’s nursery.
CUNK: Ouch. So, what have we learned?
HENRY VIII: Never negotiate with someone who thinks they speak for God.
CUNK: And always know your reservation point, yeah? The worst outcome you’d accept before walking away.
HENRY VIII: Mine was not getting a son… so I walked.
CUNK: And that, dear viewers, is how to turn a failed negotiation into a whole new religion.
HENRY VIII: I call it innovation.
CUNK: I call it iterated negotiation, mate.
HENRY VIII: I call it a royal success.
CUNK: And I call it a wrap. I’ve learned a lot today. Mainly, that if you can’t win the negotiation – just invent your own rules.
King Henry VIII Negotiation Concepts Explanation
A distributive negotiation occurs when the opposite sides of the interactive are competing over one issue and have exclusive outcomes (Harvard Law School, 2025). In this scenario, either the Pope allows Henry to divorce Catherine or he does not. In distributive cases, a gain for one side results in a loss for the other, making compromise difficult or impossible; if the divorce is permitted, the Pope is rejecting his faith; if the divorce is not allowed, the Catholic Church loses the support of Britain and its monarchy.
When the Pope refused to grant the annulment, Henry turned to his best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), which was to break away from the Catholic Church and establish the Church of England, which would allow him to annul his marriage (Dahlen & Eichstädt, 2020).
When the Pope refused to grant the annulment, Henry pursued his BATNA. This outcome significantly improved Henry’s position, allowing him to divorce Catherine and be the leader of his own Church. This weakened the Pope’s influence over England and the support of the monarchy. This move maximised Henry’s gain, but it was not a Pareto-efficient solution (Montazeri et al., 2020) because a Pareto-efficient solution occurs when the most beneficial decision for both parties is made, as no further negotiations can make one side better off without making the other worse off.
A 3D negotiation considers tactics used at the table but also the design of the deal and the setup away from the table (Lax & Sebenius, 2006). Tactics at the table focus on the people and processes involved in the negotiation. To better 'set' the table, the key negotiator can employ several moves; some examples include improving communication by building trust, using emotions and countering hardball tactics. Henry employed tactics at the table by sending Cardinal Wolsey to Rome to build rapport. However, the design of the deal, the creative structuring of an agreement that could have created value for each side, was limited as all Henry offered was a continued alliance with Britain. The setup away from the table, which refers to shaping the context and parties, was not optimally managed, as Henry had limited leverage due to the Pope’s political support from other countries.
Eventually, Henry issued a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum (Staff, 2019), where one party presents a final offer without room for negotiation. This is not an efficient move, ideally Henry could have expanded the pie where parties seek to create additional value or options rather than only dividing existing ones (Mirra, 2023). This challenges the myth of the fixed pie, that the only possible outcomes of a negotiation are win-lose (PON Staff, 2019b). Unfortunately, Henry stuck with the fixed pie model.
Opportunities for logrolling (PON Staff, 2020), where parties trade off issues of differing importance to reach a mutually beneficial outcome, were not explored. For example, Henry might have offered the Pope influence over other areas of the British people, in exchange for the annulment.
There was no Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) (Dahlen & Eichstädt, 2020) in this negotiation, meaning there was no overlap between the minimum Henry was willing to accept and the maximum the Pope was willing to offer.
Henry’s reservation point (Berlin & Lexa, 2007), the least favourable outcome he was willing to accept, was a future without a male heir, which he deemed unacceptable. As a result, he chose to exit the negotiation entirely.
This example also illustrates an iterated negotiation (Press & Dyson, 2012), a negotiation that lasts over a long period; Henry's attempts to secure the annulment spanned several years (1527 to 1533). Furthermore, it is an iterated negotiation because the consequences of one negotiation affect future interactions. Henry’s break with Rome had lasting implications for his subsequent marriages and the religious and political landscape of England.
Dick Turpin Script
CUNK: My next guest is Dick Turpi. Highwayman, robber, and a man whose reputation is mostly the result of a flattering PR campaign. Dick, hello.
TURPIN: Aye, though I suspect I’m in for a stitch-up.
CUNK: Absolutely. Now, you’re famous for shouting “Stand and deliver!” at rich people on dark roads. That’s negotiation, isn’t it? Just with more weaponry.
TURPIN: More of a one-sided discussion. I ask, they deliver. Saves time on haggling.
CUNK: That’s called hard bargaining. Very effective! Unless the other person also has a gun. Or an army. But before you became Britain’s most famous highwayman, you were in the Essex Gang. Bit more smash-and-grab than stand-and-deliver, wasn’t it?
TURPIN: Aye, we raided farmhouses, terrorised folk. Proper brutal. Less poetry, more bludgeoning.
CUNK: See, this is the bit people leave out when they imagine you as a dashing rogue. You weren’t just nicking silk purses, you were running a countryside crime ring. That’s key in negotiation: controlling the market. You and your mates had a monopoly on rural terror.
TURPIN: Until they got caught, and I legged it, yes.
CUNK: Smart move. Survival is the ultimate negotiation tactic. So, you rebranded as a highwayman. Like when bands split and the least-talented member goes solo. How did that go?
TURPIN: Not too bad! Got a bit of notoriety. Did alright with the robbing, not so much with the escaping.
CUNK: No, because your biggest mistake was underestimating bad admin. You went into hiding as John Palmer, then wrote a letter to your family. And that’s how they caught you.
TURPIN: Aye, stitched up by a postman. Truly humiliating.
CUNK: That’s what we call a failure in strategic deception. You were all about grand gestures, big robberies, dashing escapes, but in the end, dodgy handwriting did you in. Like a modern criminal getting caught tagging themselves on Instagram.
TURPIN: A proper shame, that.
CUNK: And then, when sentenced to hang, you staged a whole event. New outfit, hired mourners, even handed out gloves. That’s not a negotiation; that’s a PR stunt.
TURPIN: Well, if you’re going out, might as well do it in style.
CUNK: Right, because nothing says "fearsome outlaw" like personally organising your own funeral procession. But here’s the thing: your whole career was about making threats. And threats only work if people believe you’ll follow through. That’s why you built a reputation like a 1700s Madman Theory.
TURPIN: Aye, reputation was everything. No one wants to gamble with their life.
CUNK: Exactly. But if you use threats too often without follow-through, they stop working. That’s why you had to stay unpredictable. Like escalating from theft to, well, being a menace.
TURPIN: That, or folk got wise and started travelling in armed convoys.
CUNK: Right, which is why blackmailers, kidnappers, and terrorists today have to manage their threats. If people think you’ll just take a bribe, you lose leverage. But if you go too far, like cutting off an ear, it backfires.
TURPIN: A delicate balance.
CUNK: That’s negotiation. And why most successful business people don’t rely on pistols. So, lesson of the day, negotiation works best when you think ahead. Also, maybe don’t write letters if you’re on the run.
Dick Turpin Negotiation Concepts Explanation
Hard bargaining is a negotiation approach where one party uses aggressive demands, limited concessions, or threats to achieve their aims (PON Staff, 2019a). An example of this method is Turpin’s use of forceful tactics, such as the phrase “Stand and deliver”, where negotiation was replaced with coercion.
Positional leverage (Otugo et al., 2023) refers to the advantage a party holds due to their perceived authority, alternatives, or control over resources. Turpin increased his leverage by rebranding himself as a feared and independent highwayman, which influenced how others interacted with him.
The negotiation environment (Staff, 2020) involves the broader context in which a negotiation occurs, including factors like the power dynamics between the two parties, external pressures, and historical relationships. Turpin made sure to work in environments with limited law enforcement and public fascination with highwaymen, which enabled his success.
Strategic deception involves the deliberate use of misinformation to mislead the opposing party for advantage (Heuer, 1981). Turpin used this method when assuming a false identity to evade capture, though the eventual failure of this strategy, due to a letter exposing him, revealed the risks involved.
Reputation plays a key role in negotiation, particularly in repeated interactions, as it shapes expectations and influences future behaviour (Tinsley et al., 2008). Turpin’s cultivated image as bold and dangerous helped secure compliance from victims, though it later undermined any possibility of leniency.
Threats in negotiation are an example of an aggressive negotiation technique. They are statements intended to compel action by invoking the risk of harm if demands are not met (Staff, 2021). Turpin’s career relied heavily on threats, though their effectiveness depended on the perceived credibility of violence.
The Madman Theory refers to a strategy where a negotiator feigns irrational or extreme behaviour to increase perceived risk and leverage (National Security Archive, 2023). Turpin’s unpredictable and dangerous character enhanced fear among travellers. However, over time, these tactics became less effective, illustrating how such strategies can diminish in impact if overused or if countermeasures arise.
Marie Antoinette Script
CUNK: Right, so, Marie Antoinette, you’re the Queen of France. That must be nice. But the people are starving, which I suppose is less nice. You’re saying they should just eat cake. Tell me Marie, how is cake the same as bread?
ANTOINETTE: Ah, it is not, but cake is a delightful and nourishing alternative, no? We must be practical. If bread is scarce, should we not turn to what is available?
CUNK: Right, but that sounds like you're just framing cake as an alternative to influence perception, basically a fancy way of making a rubbish idea sound nice.’ But people don’t see cake as an alternative to bread, do they? That’s like saying, ‘Oh, you can’t afford petrol? Why not fill your car with Fanta?’
ANTOINETTE: Let us consider the alternatives. If no agreement is reached, the people remain hungry, discontent rises, and civil unrest follows. Surely, a creative solution is preferable to chaos. I am willing to offer incentives, perhaps a reduction in the price of flour used for pastries?
CUNK: But you are just swapping one thing people can’t afford for something even more expensive. How are you trying to convince people that cake isn’t just posh bread but actually an upgrade?
ANTOINETTE: Perception is everything. I’m not saying they must suffer without bread; I’m just presenting cake as an exciting alternative, and in return, maybe they can just be less cross with me
CUNK: Yes, but see, reciprocity normally works when people actually want what you’re offering.
ANTOINETTE: I see that this is becoming a difficult conversation, I deeply understand the struggles of the people. It is most unfortunate that they are hungry. It pains me greatly.
CUNK: I’m sure it does, Marie. Must be absolutely gut-wrenching to watch from inside your golden palace, surrounded by cake. Have you considered avoiding overconfidence which, in your case, means realising you’re being a bit of a tit?
ANTOINETTE: A queen is never a tit.
CUNK: Well, I’m not sure making poor people prove their loyalty for cheap bread is a great idea. That’s less of a meal plan and more of a cult initiation.
ANTOINETTE: A queen must never appear desperate. If the people reject these offers, we find ourselves in greater peril. However, I remain confident that mutual understanding can be achieved. By meeting in the middle, neither side leaves empty-handed.
CUNK: Ah, yes. That’s why they’re currently sharpening their pitchforks. Well, Marie, it’s been illuminating. I now understand why this negotiation has failed so spectacularly. Any final words?
ANTOINETTE: Let them eat…
CUNK: I wouldn’t finish that sentence. In fact, you’ve been arguing for so long that I think you feel like you have to see it through, even when it's clearly a terrible idea. But, Your Majesty, I think the people are past appreciating optimism. They’re more in a ‘storm the palace’ kind of mood.
Thanks for watching "Cunk on Negotiation." See you next time!
Marie Antoinette Negotiation Concepts Explanation
Framing is the strategic presentation of options to shape how they are interpreted (Neale et al., 1987). Marie attempts to frame cake as a substitute for bread, portraying it as a creative and positive alternative during scarcity. This is closely linked to the concept of perception management, where a negotiator seeks to influence how a proposal is viewed by others (Bhardwaj & Sharma, 2024). By emphasising the cake’s value, Marie seeks to shift public sentiment despite its impracticality.
The discussion touches on the idea of alternatives, especially through Marie’s reference to civil unrest if no agreement is reached, an implicit consideration of the best alternative to a negotiated Agreement (BATNA), where the failure to find a solution could lead to social instability and civil unrest (Dahlen & Eichstädt, 2020).
She also refers to incentives, attempting to offer something of perceived value, for example, cheaper pastry flour, to make the public compliant (Miller & Whitford, 2002). However, as Cunk points out, incentives must align with the recipient's needs, introducing the principle of reciprocity, which suggests that exchanges must be mutually desirable to succeed (Budiu, 2014).
The issue of overconfidence also arises because Marie appears unaware of the limitations of her position and overestimates the acceptance of her offer. An overconfidence bias often leads to poor negotiation outcomes (Staff, 2023).
Lastly, in the scene, Marie references the idea of meeting in the middle, a simplistic form of compromise aimed at resolving conflict, but one that is ineffective here due to the absence of overlapping interests or practical solutions (Christian, 2023). Overall, the failed negotiation reflects how poor framing, mismatched incentives, and misjudged perceptions can lead to breakdowns in communication and deepen existing conflict.
References
Berlin, J. W., & Lexa, F. J. (2007). Negotiation Techniques for Health Care Professionals. Journal of the American College of Radiology, 4(7), 487–491. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacr.2006.12.015
Bhardwaj, B., & Sharma, D. (2024). Role of Perception in Negotiation. Emerald Publishing Limited EBooks, 117–127. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83797-971-420241011
Budiu, R. (2014). The Reciprocity Principle: Give Before You Take in Web Design. Nielsen Norman Group. https://www.nngroup.com/articles/reciprocity-principle/
Christian, K. (2023). Splitting The Difference In Negotiation: A Double-Edged Sword. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kwamechristian/2023/03/26/splitting-the-difference-in-negotiation-a-double-edged-sword/
Dahlen, N., & Eichstädt, T. (2020). Alternatives vs. time – measuring the force of distinct sources of bargaining power. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 388, 56–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48641-9_5
Harvard Law School. (2025). Distributive Negotiation. PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. https://www.pon.harvard.edu/tag/distributive-negotiation/
Heuer, R. J. (1981). Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach. International Studies Quarterly, 25(2), 294. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600359
Lax, D., & Sebenius, J. K. (2006). 3-D Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals. Www.hbs.edu; Harvard Business School Press. https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=22751
Miller, G. J., & Whitford, A. B. (2002). Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent Negotiations. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 14(2), 231–267. https://doi.org/10.1177/095169280201400204
Mirra, M. (2023). Expanding the Pie: Strategies for Creating Value in Negotiations | Aligned. Alignednegotiation.com. https://www.alignednegotiation.com/insights/expanding-the-pie-strategies-for-creating-value-in-negotiations
Montazeri, M., Kebriaei, H., & Araabi, B. N. (2020). Learning pareto optimal solution of a multi-attribute bilateral negotiation using deep reinforcement. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 43, 100987. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2020.100987
National Security Archive. (2023). The Movement and the “Madman” . Nsarchive.gwu.edu. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault-vietnam/2023-03-24/movement-and-madman
Neale, M. A., Huber, V. L., & Northcraft, G. B. (1987). The framing of negotiations: Contextual versus task frames. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39(2), 228–241. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(87)90039-2
Otugo, O., Moon, J., & Bryant, V. (2023). Negotiation Strategies as a Pathway for Creating Equity in Medicine. Journal of Graduate Medical Education, 15(5), 544–547. https://doi.org/10.4300/jgme-d-23-00288.1
PON Staff. (2019a). 10 Hard-Bargaining Tactics & Negotiation Skills. PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/batna/10-hardball-tactics-in-negotiation/
PON Staff. (2019b, August 20). Creating Value in Integrative Negotiations: Myth of the Fixed-Pie of Resources. PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/when-the-pie-seems-too-small/
PON Staff. (2020). Negotiations and Logrolling: Discover Opportunities to Generate Mutual Gains. PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/mediation/mediation-breaking-a-partial-impasse-in-negotiations/
Press, W. H., & Dyson, F. J. (2012). Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(26), 10409–10413. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206569109
Staff, P. (2020). Your place or mine? PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/your-place-or-mine/
Staff, P. (2021). Aggressive Negotiation Tactics: Threats at the Bargaining Table. PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/how-to-make-wise-threats/
Staff, P. O. N. (2019). Get Beyond “Take It or Leave It.” PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/conflict-resolution/get-beyond-take-it-or-leave-it-nb/
Staff, P. O. N. (2023, February 9). Business Negotiation Skills Tip: Curb Your Overconfidence. PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/business-negotiations/business-negotiations-skills-tips-curb-your-overconfidence/
Tinsley, C. H., Cambria, J., & Schneider, A. K. (2008, July 22). Reputations in Negotiation. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228195677_Reputations_in_Negotiation
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.