A HYPOTHETICAL PRE-WAR NEGOTIATION:
IS THE OPIUM WAR INEVITABLE?

The Question to Settle

Was the Opium War inevitable? Or could both sides have reached a settlement after a proper face-to-face negotiation, which they’ve never had the chance to?

Here is the link to our full negotiation:
Press here!!

DESIGN

The Setting

This negotiation was conducted as a mock negotiation after the Lin Weixi incident (N.B. Source H), which hypothetically simulates a pre-war negotiation between the British Chief Superintendent of Trade, Cpt. Charles Elliot and The Chinese Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu in 1939, to see if an agreement could be made to prevent the war from breaking out.

Most historians have identified that the lack of communication is one of the reasons why the war broke out, as both sides have not engaged in a face-to-face negotiation, but only replying to each other through letters (Gelber, 2006; Gao, 2019; Kuo, 1935). The host prepared some common backgrounds to both sides before the negotiation as a starting point, and both sides were given time to research their perspectives. The host was in charge of disputing any historical debates that were in question during the mock negotiation.

A brief set of historical background information (Sources A-H) was provided to both sides, which the negotiators are required to read. A concise edit of the information document provided is as follows, literal sources used for the background information were cited in-text and in the references of this blog:

Source A - The background of the China-Britain Trade.

Source B - The background of the Canton System and the Sea Ban.

Source C - The background of Sino-centrism and the Macartney Incident, 1973.

Source D - The background of the opium trade in China and its medical values.

Source E - The background of the national opium addiction during the opium trades.

Source F - Background of Cpt. Charles Elliot.

Source G - The background of Lin Zexu and the Humen Incident.

Source H - Background of the Lin Weixi Incident and the British Response.

The scoring sheet

The host designed two versions of the scoring sheet for each side based on the background sources A to H mentioned above, and they were sent privately to the two negotiators. The sheet requires the negotiators to negotiate across 7 different items, which includes:

The laws regarding permission of opium trades (N.B. Sources D, E)
Trades concerning other goods (N.B. Sources A, C, D)
Tariffs on the traded goods
The Canton system (N.B., Source B)
Laws and regulations regarding ship crew behaviours (N.B. Sources G, H)
Compensation for opium destroyed in Humen (Source G)
British-exclusive trading rights post Lin-Weixi incident (Source H)

The negotiators have also received 2 hidden extra negotiation demands (unknown by the opposite side) where if they successfully achieve, they could score an extra 20 points for each item. The main success criteria is to prevent a war from breaking out, as this negotiation aims to investigate whether a war is avoidable. In spite of this, the negotiators were instructed to follow their historical stances. The negotiation is scored with 300 points maximum (260 for the sheet + 2*20 for extra demands)

Lin ZeXu's scoring sheet

Charles Elliot's scoring sheet

BREAKING DOWN THE NEGOTIATION

The negotiators have written a breakdown of the mock-negotiation, which is as follows:

REFLECTION

U2212485 → Lin ZeXu (Chinese Side)

As Lin Zexu, I had to adopt a very firm and unyielding stance. This inflexibility was not merely strategic but reflected a deeper belief that any concession would betray China's sovereignty and dignity. Consequently, during the negotiation, I could only pursue the most extreme options in the worksheet, viewing anything less than full compliance with Chinese demands as unacceptable.

Lin ZeXu’s uncompromising stance in negotiation first stems from his belief that war was a viable option if diplomatic efforts failed, as Lin was so confident in China’s strength and believed the British were far weaker than they truly were. Therefore, he had no incentive to compromise or negotiate flexibly. Evidence for this can be found in Lin’s own reports, where he stated that Britain “would never dare to invade a civilised nation like China” and believed China’s defenses were impenetrable (Mao, 2014), Moreover the Qing military considered their coastal defenses to be "as strong as metal walls and copper ramparts.” (蔣廷黻, 2021).

Moreover, Lin ZeXu’s deep-rooted cultural superiority and China’s sinocentrism has made him believe that the British are worthy of equal footing. This consequently also would make him not approach the British as equals and ultimately create his uncompromising stance in the negotiation. It was believed that Qing China saw itself as the peak of global civilisation, in which they viewed foreigners as barbarians (Hanes & Sanello, 2004). This is also reflected in Lin’s own wording, in which he referred to China as the “Inner Land” or “Centre Land” in his letters to the British (Waley & Waley, 2013). Therefore, Chinese’s cultural superiority may lead to any perceived concession or compromise on sovereignty (such as apologising) could be interpreted as humiliation, and could lead to domestic discontent.

Lin ZeXu was also fundamentally anti-opium and had a long history of using aggressive tactics to fight it, therefore this meant that even potential compromises in the negotiation that preserved peace were unacceptable if they did not guarantee a full ban. This can be seen in his previous policies, which included seizing and destroying opium, threatening foreign traders with execution, and shutting down British trade in Canton (徐中約 et al., 1970). He also isolated trading quarters, detained Charles Elliot and 350 merchants, while arresting two senior Chinese merchants to force British compliance (王建秋, 1965).

U2243156 → Charles Elliot (British Side)

As Charles Elliot, I adopt a firm and pragmatic stance in this negotiation, shaped by British’s objective, legal principles, and frustration towards Lin’s inflexibility and condescending approach. My primary goals were to protect British traders, secure compensation for the destroyed opium, and uphold extraterritoriality, while avoiding humiliation. Due to role restrictions, Qing’s rigid mindset, and Lin’s uncompromising demands, I had limited flexibility in seeking for a decent resolution while avoiding conflict.

Charles Elliot initially approached this negotiation pragmatically, viewing

Lin Zexu as equals and believing that through negotiation, and some extent of compromise, they could potentially meet a balance and satisfy some demands from each side. Despite personally being opposed to the moral consequences of the opium trade (Hansard, 4 April 1843 col 365-366), he was constrained by his role and recognises the economic necessity for Britain for keeping opium trade, given the massive trade deficit caused by high demands for Chinese goods. Therefore, rather than insisting on keeping the opium trade as it was, he was willing to regulate or reduce opium imports in exchange for expanded trading in other goods, reduction in tariffs, or access to more ports, maintaining British’s commercial interests while moving closer to Lin Zexu’s objective of destroying opium. Although he was aware of Britain’s naval superiority, he preferred diplomatic solutions over conflict as war would bring a lot of unnecessary destruction (Hansard, 4 April 1843 col 365-366) .

However, Elliot adopted a firm stance in some aspects, particularly in protecting national dignity and legal sovereignty. He refused behaviours that undermined Britain as an equal power such as the Chinese ritual to kowtow (Cox, 2018) and viewed Lin Zexu’s labelling of ‘barbarians' as insults. Furthermore, he refused to hand over British subjects to Chinese law, which employed collective punishments that were deemed as cruel and unjust. This was unassailable for Elliot and the British, and therefore took a firm stance in defending national honour and British citizen’s legal rights against what he perceived to be a cruel and archaic system. Therefore, just like previous simulations and historical context, it was not surprising that this simulated negotiation ended in a stalemate. These fundamental disagreements in principles along with the uncompromising stance of Lin Zexu made a successful negotiation impossible.

Reasons for unsuccessful negotiation:

It was not surprising to us that our simulated negotiation ended in a stalemate, as this outcome aligns closely with the historical context and mirrors previous simulations (Lubot, 1976). The failure to reach an agreement stemmed from numerous irreconcilable differences between the two sides, particularly in legal, cultural, and political aspects, in which these differences made it nearly impossible to find common ground. Moreover, no relationship was built prior to this incident, making compromise and understanding difficult. Likewise, the high stakes of the discussions, Lin’s aggressiveness, along with heightened tensions, precluded the time and mental capacity for empathy and understanding.

Legal differences and disputes between China and Britain led to serious misunderstandings. In Qing China, there was no clear discrimination between civil and criminal laws (Chen, 2015). Punishment was often collective (曹成建, 2007), unlike British systems which were rooted in individual rights and legal precedent. Additionally, Chinese law wishes to assert jurisdiction over all crimes committed on its soil, including those by foreigners, which clashed with the British demand for extraterritorial rights (Hanes & Sanello, 2004).

Cultural differences also played a role, in which the conceptions of trade were fundamentally different between the Chinese and the British. While the British viewed trade as a relationship between equal sovereign states, Qing China viewed trade was a way for foreign nations to show admiration and submission to the Celestial Empire (王建秋, 1965), in which goods from other nations were seen as gifts or tributes (Fryman, 2025).

Furthermore, previous diplomatic incidents had also intensified the conflict, which included Macartney (1793); Amherst (1816), and lastly Napier (1834). Foreign visitors to the Chinese court were expected to perform the kowtow before the emperor, which included bowing, kneeling, and touching their forehead to the ground nine times. However, Macartney refused to perform the kowtow and insisted on offering only the British-style gesture of kneeling on one knee, in which this deeply displeased the emperor (郭廷以, 2019). Lord Amherst’s mission in 1816 added to the Chinese’s resentment, in which he flatly refused to perform the kowtow (Hanes & Sanello, 2004). Lastly, Napier in 1834 arrived at the harbour of Whampoa in a British warship without first obtaining permission from the Chinese authorities (Hao, 2014).

On the British side, one critical factor that contributed to the unsuccessful negotiation was Elliot’s mistaken decision under pressure when Lin Zexu blockaded British merchants (Gelber, 2006). Forced into a desperate position, he made an unauthorised guarantee that the British government would compensate the traders, which was then refused by the British government. This further weakened Charles’s bargaining position for compensation, as Lin Zexu perceived the surrender to be a voluntary decision, not coercion. With both China and Britain’s refusal to offer compensation, this ultimately contributed significantly to the British’s decision to advocate war (Stephen, 2021).

Ultimately, these fundamental clashes in objectives and values between the Chinese and British, and the harsh stances from both negotiators, made it nearly impossible for either side to identify a ZOPA between the two sides. As a result, both parties ultimately defaulted to their BATNA - war.

ANALYSING THE NEGOTIATION
Overall Barriers to Agreement

The negotiators have identified the overall barriers during the negotiation that resulted in the failed agreement; their reports are as follows:

What could have been improved in the negotiation?

This negotiation could have been significantly improved through fostering a deeper understanding of each side’s cultural perspective and adopting a more culturally sensitive, integrative, and interest-based approach. While carefully considering the realistic constraints at that time, the following contemporary negotiation theories could help identify the avoidable negotiation mistakes.

The mutual inability to engage with each other’s fundamental values was a key obstacle to successful negotiation. For instance, the British could have shown more diplomatic flexibility towards the Chinese's sino-centric ideology, such as acknowledging that they were positioned as subordinate rather than equals (Musgrave et al., 2000). They could have strategically framed their demands accordingly, such as using language and rituals that respected Qing’s norms to accommodate Chinese’s cultural identity emphasis on ‘face’. By doing so, the British could have preserved Qing officials’ self-esteem and enabled them to feel more respected (Stone et al., 2023), avoiding hostile attitudes that might have contributed to the escalation and establishing a more favourable foundation to a successful negotiation.

Likewise, applying the first dimension of 3D Negotiation (Lax & Sebenius, 2006) the choice of negotiators could have been more strategically considered. Lin Zexu’s rigidity and Elliot’s lack of formal diplomatic training (Butchko, 2025) made compromises inherently difficult. A more pragmatic Chinese official and a more experienced British individual might have been better suited to navigate the complexities. Including a third party (Crump, 2006) such as a culturally familiar mediator alongside Lin Zexu and Elliot, could also ease tensions and bridge the diplomatic divide, fostering better communication by minimising cross-cultural miscommunications. Furthermore, the Chinese party could have considered a more integrative approach such as exploring other trading options with Britain in exchange for a gradual restriction on opium imports. This could maintain British’s commercial interests by providing time for merchants to shift towards other products without causing economic collapse, whilst achieving China’s primary objective in eliminating opium, in addition to fostering trust and better relations between both nations that are beneficial in the long run (Elgoibar et al., 2021).

Moreover, given the high distrust and tension from both sides, focusing on interest-based techniques such as cultivating a transparent communication (Fisher et al., 2011) would benefit the situation. They could have employed strategies such as the ‘power of asking’ (Gilbert, 1991), ‘looping for understanding’ and demonstrating ‘unconditional positive regard’ (Bozarth, 2013) to better understand each other’s demand and concerns better before proposing solutions that could expand the pie. These approaches would not only prevent further misunderstandings, but also help to build minimal trust, and reduce negative devaluation, particularly when some disagreements stem from false conflict. Similarly, the British party could have applied techniques such as ‘foot-in-the door’ to increase their chances of achieving their goal (McLeod, 2023). They could have started off with a small request, such as first introducing an additional non-controversial good into the trade, before escalating to a larger request such as lifting all restrictions on their goods.

Lastly, after securing some short-term agreements and building minimal trust, they could explore some contingency arrangements. For example, Chinese could grant the British exchange to gaining new trading rights outside Canton, when they manage to decrease a certain degree of opium imports over several years. This could potentially achieve a win-win for both sides, strengthening trust and relations between the two parties, forming a foundation for a mutually beneficial future (Tomlinson et al., 2015).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

References

Antony, R. J. (2003). The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another. History: Reviews of New Books, 31(2), 85–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2003.10527954

Bozarth, J. D. (2013). Unconditional positive regard. The handbook of person-centred psychotherapy and counselling, 180-192.

Butchko, M. (2025, February 2). Miscalculations and misjudgments of the First Opium War. China Hands Magazine. https://chinahandsmagazine.org/2025/02/02/miscalculations-and-misjudgments-of-the-first-opium-war/

查禁鴉片章程. (1839) article. 39.

陳鏸勛. (1894). 香港雜記. 香港中華印務總局.

Chen, L. (2011). Universalism and Equal Sovereignty as Contested Myths of International Law in the Sino-Western Encounter. Journal of the History of International Law/Revue d'histoire du droit international, 13(1), 75-116.

Chen, L. (2015). Chinese Law in Imperial Eyes Sovereignty, Justice, and Transcultural Politics. Columbia University Press.

Cox, T. (2018). 8. ‘Money, Credit, and Strong Friends’: Warren Delano II and the Importance of Social Networking in the Old China Trade. In The Private Side of the Canton Trade, 1700–1840: Beyond the Companies (pp. 132-147). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9789888455171-011

大清律例. (n.b.) c. 146.07; 225.40; 225.41

Elgoibar, P., Medina, F. J., Euwema, M. C., & Munduate, L. (2021). Increasing integrative negotiation in European organizations through trustworthiness and trust. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, 655448.

Fisher, G. (1980). International Negotiation. Intercultural Press, Inc.

Fisher, R., Ury, W. L., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to Yes 3rd ed.

Fryman, A. (2025, April 24). Cultural Infernos: National Ideologies on the Eve of the First Opium War. Niner Commons - UNC Charlotte - J. Murrey Atkins Library; University of North Carolina at Charlotte. https://ninercommons.charlotte.edu/record/3011?ln=en&v=pdf

Gao, H. (2019). "Conclusion". In Creating the Opium War. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. Retrieved Apr 26, 2025, from https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526133434.00013

Gelber, H. G. (2006). China as" victim"?: The Opium War that Wasn't. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University.

Gilbert, D. 1991. How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46, 107-119.

曹成建.(2007).传统制度的近代命运——国民政府保甲连坐处罚制度及其实践.中国社会科学院近代史研究所民国史研究室、四川师范大学历史文化学院.(eds.)一九四○年代的中国（上卷）(pp.178-195).社会科学文献出版社.

郭廷以. (2019). 近代中國史綱 / Jin dai Zhongguo shi gang. 中文大學出版社, Xianggang: Zhong Wen Da Xue Chu Ban She.

Hanes, T., & Sanello, F. (2004). Opium Wars. Sourcebooks, Inc.

Hansard HC Deb vol 68 col 363-366 (4 April 1843) [Electronic version].

Hao, G. (2014). Prelude to the Opium War? British reactions to the “Napier Fizzle” and attitudes towards China in the mid eighteen-thirties. Historical Research, 87(237), 491–509. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2281.12062

Harrison, Henrietta. (2018). Chinese and British Diplomatic Gifts in the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. English Historical Review. 133. 65-97. 10.1093/ehr/cey066.

蔣廷黻. (2021). 中國近代史（導讀版）. 中華書局（香港）有限公司,聯合電子出版有限公司（代理）.

Kuo, Pin-chia. (1935). A Critical Study of the First Anglo-Chinese War with Documents. Shanghai, China: The Commercial press,limited, 1935. Print.

Kwon, H. Y. (2010). From Sinocentrism to Civilization Discourse. The Review of Korean Studies, 13(3), 13-30, https://doi.org/10.25024/review.2010.13.3.001

Lax, D. A., & Sebenius, J. K. (2006). 3-D negotiation: Powerful tools to change the game in your most important deals. Harvard Business Press.

李圭. (1896). 鴉片事略.

李時珍. (1578). 本草綱目.

林滿紅. (2007). 近代中國自產鴉片之替代進口鴉片(1805-1906). 中央研究院人文社會科學研究中心亞太區域研究專題中心.

林启彥 & 林锦源. (2000). 论中英两国政府处理林维喜事件的手法与态度（之一）. 歷史研究.

林启彥 & 林锦源. (2007). 论中英两国政府处理林维喜事件的手法与态度（之二）

Li, X. B. & Fang, Q. (2013). Modern Chinese Legal Reform: New Perspectives. University of Kentucky Press

Lubot, E. S. (1976). A Simulation of the Opium War Negotiations. The History Teacher, 9(2), 210. https://doi.org/10.2307/492288

羅浩歷. (1997). 香港年報. Yearbook.gov.hk. https://www.yearbook.gov.hk/1997/cindex.htm

Mao, H. J. (2014). 天朝的崩溃 : 鸦片战争再研究 = The collapse of the heavenly dynasty / Tian chao de beng kui : Ya pian zhan zheng zai yan jiu = The collapse of the heavenly dynasty. Sheng Huodu Shuxin Zhi San Lian Shu Dian.

McLeod, S. (2023). Techniques of Compliance in Psychology. Simply Psychology, 14.

Musgrave, T., & Musgrave, W. (2000). An empire of plants: people and plants that changed the world. (No Title).

Noel, J. (2019). The History and Significance of English Phrases Originating in China Coast Pidgin. International Linguistics Research.

宋伟哲. (2015). 苛内媚外：中国传统法文化的另一面——以洪任辉案和亨特著作为切入点. Graduate Law Review. CUPL.

Starkey, B., Boyer, M. A., & Wilkenfeld, J. (2005). Negotiating a Complex World. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Stephen R. Platt, ‘Introduction to FO17, the British Foreign Office Archival Collection on China, 1815-1905’, China and the Modern World: Imperial China and the West, Part I (1815-1881), Cengage Learning (EMEA) Ltd, 2021 https://www.gale.com/binaries/content/assets/gale-us-en/primary-sources/intl-gps/intl-gps-essays/full-ghn-contextual essays/gps_essay_camw5_platt_introduction_fo_17.pdf

Stone, D., Patton, B., & Heen, S. (2023). Difficult conversations: How to discuss what matters most. Penguin.

Su, C. (2008). Justifiers of the British Opium Trade: Arguments by Parliament, Traders, and the Times Leading Up to the Opium War. Stanford Undergraduate Research Journal.

Summers, C. C. (2016). Addiction, Arrogance, and Aggression: The Question of Attitude in the First Opium War. 5, 3. https://scholarworks.harding.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=tenor

Tomlinson, E. C., & Lewicki, R. J. (2015). The negotiation of contractual agreements. Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation, 1(1), 85-98.

Waley, A., & Waley, A. (2013). The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes. Routledge.

王建秋. (1965). 中國近代史.

Watkins, M., & Rosegrant, S. (2001). Breakthrough international negotiation : how great negotiators transformed the world’s toughest post-Cold War conflicts. Jossey-Bass.

徐伯寧. (n.d.) 蟫精雋. c. 10

徐明德. (1995). 论十四至十九世纪中国的闭关锁国政策. 海交史研究, 1

徐中約, Ji, Q., Qingbao Zhu, Mao, J., & Chengdan Qian. (1970). 中國近代史. 上册 : 1600-1923年 / Zhongguo jin dai shi. Shang ce : 1600-1923 nian. Zhong Wen Da Xue Chu Ban She.

Behaviour Change

Sunday, April 27, 2025

Bluff, Break or Back Down; the Psychology of Blackmail

Meme Coins