The Real Theft Was the Trust We Lost Along the Way!

Trust, Emotion, Threats and Mistakes: An Observation of Negotiation Knowledge in Ordinary, Unfamiliar People

By Jessica Varghese & Azhar Munim

Background

Inspired by the negotiation exercises performed during lectures, this blog post provides an overview of a collaborative task designed to test multiple negotiation skills taught in the PS379 module.

Learning about how to successfully negotiate during these lectures was incredibly useful, but not everyone has had the privilege to learn and apply these skills. This results in many people making common negotiation mistakes due to underestimating the value of each of their actions.

So, the main aim of conducting this task was to observe how ordinary people would react to negotiation challenges. We observed the mistakes they made, but also which strategies they would unknowingly apply without any prior knowledge of negotiation and influence.

Introduction

What happens when every person in the room has part of the truth — but no one is willing to give it away for free?

In our negotiation task, we designed and ran a negotiation-based role-playing experience centred on the aftermath of an international artifact heist. Five players, each holding a unique piece of the puzzle, had to work with (or against) each other to recover the stolen item.

However, each player was a suspect, with a hidden core goal they each wished to achieve.

The freedom of action, combined with the novel situation, revealed how people actually behaved in complex negotiations – but also how quickly negotiations spiral when alliances break down, threats are made, and all trust fizzles away.

This blog unpacks the key decisions, negotiation strategies and group dynamics that shaped the game. We have drawn on research about negotiation and influence to interpret the players’ choices and explain each members potential thought processes. This allows us to assess whether our predictions of ‘ordinary behaviour’ were correct, or if negotiations are truly as unpredictable as human nature...

The Scenario:

"Warwick, 2096.

Once a university. Now an archive of art, memory and power.
After the War of Wick reshaped the world, the Faculty of Arts building was rebuilt as a museum – a resting place for disputed histories.
Somewhere beneath the marble and glass, the Wick Blade was locked away.

An artifact with a dangerous past. A blade passed between powerful hands, just before everything fell apart.

Last night, it disappeared.
No noise. No trace. Just silence.

Now, five individuals have been summoned behind closed doors.
A historian. A curator. A dealer. An agent. A forger.

Each had something to offer – and something to hide.

The goal: recover the dagger, rewrite the story, protect what matters most".

 

Recruitment

Five individuals willing to take part in a “negotiation task” were brought into a room together, accompanied by us. Each participant was made aware of the scenario above, and was randomly assigned one of the following roles, all with private objectives and leverage.

Below is a brief description of each of the five roles, alongside the description cards provided to the respective player.

(On request of the negotiators, we have kept their real identities private, only referring to their roles in this blog)

 

Character	Identity	Core Goal	Holds…
The Forger	Black-market artist who forged a replica	Immunity from prosecution	Details of the fake dagger
Interpol Agent	Law enforcer looking for a public arrest	Reputation & justice	Surveillance image of the thief
Museum Curator	Insider facing exposure	Self-preservation	Timeline of the theft + access codes
Black Market Dealer	Fixer with underground links	Crypto payment or revenge	Name of the buyer
Historian	Academic expert in artifacts	Exclusive publishing rights	Political origin of the dagger

    

Theoretical Lens

We didn’t brief players on negotiation concepts beforehand. Instead, we designed the scenario to test key ideas from negotiation and influence theory, including:

Distributive negotiations

Ø  Positional bargaining (Patton, 2015): negotiating from their initial positions and demands whilst refusing to change perspectives as the value of information shifts

Ø  Viewing the negotiation as a ‘win or lose’ situation

Ø  Attempting to individually maximise their gains from an assumed ‘fixed sum’

 

Integrative negotiations

Ø  Solving problems together to benefit multiple negotiators – as opposed to haggling for control or personal ideals (Fisher & Ury, 2012)

Ø  Being clear about their issues and goals to trade and negotiate with others – logrolling

Ø  “Expanding the pie” - exploring options to increase the total negotiation benefits (Benetti et al., 2021)

 

BATNA – Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement

Ø  If participants can recognise the consequences of ‘walking away’ from a negotiation (Fisher, 1991)

Ø  Knowing when to back out of a negotiation – such as if the alternative is better than its likely outcome (Wang & Zionts, 2008)

Ø  Identifying the BATNAs of everyone involved, and how much each negotiator is willing to negotiate around it – having a costly BATNA demonstrates bargaining weakness (McKibben, 2020)

Ø  Keeping negotiation offers within the ZOPA

 

ZOPA – Zone of Possible Agreement

Ø   The gap between the BATNAs in a negotiation

Ø  Agreements preferred by the involved groups (Cavatorta et al., 2025)

Ø  The existence of multiple BATNAs at once means there is not one single common ZOPA – negotiators will need to decide who to appease, and who to disregard

 

3D negotiation – “Tactics, Deal Design, Setup” (Lax & Sebenius, 2006)

Ø  Tactics: Understanding the nature of distributive and integrative negotiations

Ø  Deal Design: Expanding the outlines of the deal, increasing its value

Ø  Setup: Approaching the negotiation to create the most promising environment to achieve your goals – such as asserting control or forming alliances

Influence and Coercion

Ø  Judging if participants will resort to verbal, relational, or emotional threats to leverage control in the negotiations

Ø  Acknowledging that failed threats will create scepticism in their confidence (Kim, 2022)

Ø  Whether roles which depend on sabotaging others for success (Interpol Officer, Black Market Dealer), which incorporate a ‘madman strategy’, unpredictably acting against their own interests to undermine their opposition (Boussios, 2021)

Managing Difficult Conversations

Ø  Conflict of interests can cause feelings of stress, anxiety and anger – potentially impairing rational thinking, animosity, and exclusions in the group (Ellis, 2020)

Ø  Participants who disregard values of trust and resort to personal ego attacks are likely to fail in negotiations

Ø  Participants who disregard values of trust and resort to personal ego attacks are likely to fail in negotiations

Ø  Valuing the importance of listening to minimise resentment and misinformation, while encouraging the sharing of thoughts and opinions (Weinstein et al., 2022)

These negotiation frameworks helped us understand what potential decisions would be made based on theory, and in turn, how real negotiation may differ from “ideal” negotiation.

Our Predictions of Behaviour

The unpredictable nature of human behaviour and the open-ended negotiation task make it difficult to predict a set outcome or a specific sequence of events.

However, from our knowledge of negotiation strategies and their common pitfalls, we can anticipate specific behaviours we expect to see from a group of ordinary people, unfamiliar with negotiation and influence.

BATNAs, ZOPAs, and First Offers

We expect negotiators to overlook the importance of their BATNA and ZOPA, leading to poor first offers.

We suspect these first offers to be either overly generous, giving up too much negotiating ground, or overly aggressive, causing immediate rejection.

On the other hand, we similarly suspect that poorly managed counteroffers will expose too much information, weakening their position. In turn, this may make a previously ineffective first offer into a useful one.

Distributive vs Integrative Negotiations

We predict that negotiators will likely approach the task as distributive at first, aiming to maximise their personal gain whilst withholding personal information.

However, as discussions progress and shared interests between negotiators emerge, we expect a shift towards integrative negotiation, leading to more efficient agreements in retrieving the artifact (Brett & Thompson, 2016).

We additionally suspect that negotiators who have singled themselves out as weak by exposing too much personal information will be excluded from integrative negotiation agreements.

Threats, Trust, and Ego

We anticipate that emotions, threats and ego will be key factors in the negotiation outcome.

Those who use emotional intelligence to build alliances are likely to succeed, while those who provoke anger or engage in personal attacks will lose credibility, leverage, and disrupt the group’s negotiations (Steinel et al., 2008).

We predict that threats will specifically play an important role, with individuals who yield under pressure ending up with poorer negotiation results.

What Happened in the Game?

The negotiation session unfolded organically, without any formal structure, yet numerous distinct phases and turning points emerged. These events accurately mirrored fundamental theories and psychological phenomena that we explored throughout PS379, and ultimately, they impacted the distribution of power and the final outcome.

In this section, we will go over each key turning point sequentially. For each moment, we will include quotes from our participants to illustrate their decision making, as well as a thorough analysis based on the theories that we learnt in PS370 and wider literature. By doing this, we will be able to critically assess what happened, why participants behaved the way they did, and how theory can explain/fail to explain real negotiation dynamics.

Note: The participant quotes featured in the following Turning Points were taken from post-session reflections. They were collected immediately after the game to reflect each player’s personal reasoning and emotional response to their actions.

Turning Point 1: Early Anchoring and Loss of Power

The Interpol Agent assertively began the negotiation by demanding transparency from all parties. The Museum Curator, feeling vulnerable and exposed, quickly gave in and disclosed sensitive information such as access logs and security information to prove that she wasn’t involved in the theft.

“I felt like if I didn’t move quickly, I was going to be the scapegoat. I had to give them something, even if it wasn’t much at all.” - Museum Curator

Analysis:

This early concession demonstrates the risks of anchoring bias and premature information disclosure (Hills, 2024, Lecture 3). The Curator’s decision to reveal crucial information without gaining anything in return set a weak anchor that reduced her negotiation power.

According to distributive negotiation theory, premature disclosures are strategic errors that allow the opponents to shape the negotiation space in their favour (Hills, 2024, Lecture 3). Additionally, the Curator had poor awareness of their BATNA, failing to recognise alternative strategies such as forming defensive alliances or withholding information in order to maintain negotiating leverage (McKibben, 2013).

Outcome: As a result of this premature disclosure, the Curator lost essential negotiating leverage early on. She was viewed as vulnerable by the other participants, making her a prime target for pressure tactics and emotional coercion in subsequent interactions.

Turning Point 2: Breakdown of Trust and Missed Integrative Deal

Shortly later, the Forger approached the Historian and proposed an integrative exchange: immunity protection in exchange for exclusive rights to publish the findings regarding the origin of the dagger. Although this arrangement could have been mutually beneficial and created value for both parties, the Historian declined the Forger’s offer due to distrust.

“It sounded like a fair deal, but it didn’t feel like the right time. I wasn’t sure if I could trust her.” - Historian

Analysis: This missed opportunity emphasises how fragile integrative negotiation efforts can be when relational trust is lacking (Hills, 2024, Lecture 4). According to negotiation theory, logrolling, exchanging concessions across issues of different value, is only effective when there is sufficient trust to make those trades feel secure (Lecture 4; Kuwabara, 2011; Moran & Ritov, 2002). Additionally, Curhan et al. (2006) argue that negotiators value subjective feelings about fairness and trust, as much as, if not more than, objective outcomes, which explains why the historian declined this rational offer.

Outcome: The breakdown of trust in this early exchange created an atmosphere of growing suspicion among the participants. Consequently, future collaboration opportunities became more difficult to identify and pursue, steering the negotiation environment towards defensiveness and competition.

 

Turning Point 3: Information Hoarding and Defensive Bargaining

Following the early betrayals and missed deals, the negotiating environment became increasingly defensive. Participants resorted to information hoarding, making vague proposals and hints, but refusing to reveal specifics unless directly reciprocated.

“Everyone kept dropping hints, but no one was willing to share anything unless they had something to gain from it” – Museum Curator.

This transition marks a shift from integrative to distributive bargaining, prompted by the deterioration of trust amongst the participants (Hills, 2024, Lecture 4). When negotiators perceive trust as broken, they tend to move away from problem-solving and instead treat every piece of information as a bargaining chip to be protected. Steinel et al. (2010) found that negotiators strategically withhold information under conditions of low trust and adopt more defensive and competitive behaviours to protect their own positions. Instead of expanding the pie through collaboration, the participants began to view the negotiation as a zero-sum struggle, where any disclosure of information was viewed as a potential liability.

This defensive mindset aligns with difficult conversations theory (Hills, 2024, Lecture 5), which explains how emotional defensiveness and fear of exploitation can erode the foundations of cooperative behaviour, replacing open conversation with self-defensive behaviour.

Outcome: After open information sharing broke down, the negotiation shifted into a zero-sum struggle. Participants became increasingly focused on protecting their own interests, which made it more difficult to generate joint value or explore creative agreements.

 

Turning Point 4: Emotional Coercion and Blackmail

As the negotiation intensified, the Black Market Dealer used an emotionally charged threat – he exposed private texts indicating the Curator’s involvement in the theft. Though the threat was never actually executed, the threat alone was enough to induce compliance.

“I didn’t actually have to follow through. I just wanted to show him that I had the power, that’s all.” – Black Market Dealer

Analysis: The Dealer’s implied threat is consistent with major principles of coercive influence and blackmail dynamics in negotiation theory (Hills, 2024, Lecture 10). In such situations, behaviour change is driven by the perception of a credible threat rather than the execution of the explicit threat (Lecture 10; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005). The Curator’s response demonstrates how identity-based threats, such as reputational risks, can override rational decision-making and shift the focus to emotional self-protection (Klaassen et al., 2021).

Outcome:  The Dealer’s coercive tactics not only forced critical concessions from the Curator but also normalised the use of threats as a legitimate bargaining tool within the group. The rise in emotional pressure further eroded trust and destabilised trust and strategic cooperation among all participants.

 

Turning Point 5: Identity Crisis and Competitive Death Spiral

As the participants became more emotionally reactive, mainly the Curator and Interpol Agent, the negotiation deteriorated into a competitive death spiral. Accusations escalated, collaboration broke down, and irrational behaviour became increasingly more common.

“After a certain point, I stopped trying to win. I was just trying to save face.” – Curator

Analysis: This spiral depicts the dynamics of identity threat and emotional escalation described in the difficult conversations lecture (Lecture 5; Kopelman et al., 2006) When negotiators feel that their competence, integrity, or self-worth are being attacked, they shift from problem-solving to defensive posturing, ultimately leading to negotiation breakdown (Kopelman et al., 2006). In addition, Movius and Wilson (2011) show that negotiators frequently misjudge and struggle to navigate emotional dynamics, which can escalate conflict rather than resolving it. The emotional deterioration observed here supports the notion that effective negotiation depends as much on managing identity and emotions as on exchanging offers (Steinel et al, 2008)

Outcome: As emotions escalated, marginalised participants such as the Curator and Interpol Agent struggled to effectively negotiate. Their responses became reactive rather than strategic, leading them to lose influence and leaving them sidelined in the final stages of the negotiation.

 

Turning Point 6: Coalition Formation and Strategic Exclusion

As trust deteriorated, the Forger, Dealer and Historian established a private strategic coalition. They exchanged information discreetly and negotiated independently with the buyer of the artifact and intentionally excluded the Interpol Agent and Curator from critical discussions.

“I thought this whole thing was about justice. Turns out, it was all about leverage to them.” – Interpol Agent

Analysis: This coalition demonstrates the core principles of 3D negotiation, particularly setup strategy and away-from-the-table moves (Lax & Sebenius, 2006; Lecture 6). Instead of competing at the negotiating table, the members of the coalition shaped the negotiation dynamics by off-table coordination and exclusion. According to Kuwabara (2011), strong relational cohesion enables subgroups to dominate negotiations, when broader trust breaks down. In addition to coalition formation, the sequencing and timing of discreet discussions strengthened their strategic advantage (Lax & Sebenius, 2006).

Outcome: The formation of the private coalition significantly shifted the power balance. By pooling information and isolating others, the coalition members were able to dictate the final terms of the negotiation and fulfil their personal goals without opposition.

Turning Point 7: Failure of Principled Strategy (Interpol Agent)

The Interpol Agent’s steadfast commitment to justice and transparency eventually worked against him. His failure to adapt strategically or establish alliances led to him being marginalised and excluded from the final agreement.

“I kept believing that they would do the right thing. But they never did.” – Interpol Agent

Analysis: This outcome emphasises the strategic limitation of rigid principled negotiation approaches (Patton, 2015; Lecture 6). As emphasised in 3D negotiation theory (Lax & Sebenius, 2006), success in multi-party contexts requires adaptive engagement with shifting coalitions and stakeholder interests. The Interpol Agent’s failure shows that maintaining the moral high ground, without accompanying strategic flexibility and relational management, is rarely enough to gain influence or achieve favourable outcomes.

Outcome: The Interpol Agent’s unwavering commitment to moral principles ultimately led to his strategic marginalisation. His reluctance to adapt to the evolving alliance-based structure of the negotiation left him excluded from critical agreements and left him without a voice in the negotiation’s outcome.

 

Participant Reflections

After the negotiation task was completed, participants were independently asked to reflect on their own behaviour and decision-making. We also presented them with statements related to trust, pressure, and tactics, and asked them to indicate their level of agreement.

Statement	Agreement
“Trust influenced my decisions.”	4/5 ppts
“I felt pressure to concede.”	4/5 ppts
“I used deception to achieve my goals.”	3/5 ppts
“I would approach this differently now.”	5/5 ppts
“I had no idea how to properly approach this scenario at the beginning”	5/5 ppts

 

A few participants provided additional remarks to these statements, highlighting their changing thought processes as the negotiation began to spiral out of control, and grew much more defensive. These open-ended reflections were collected immediately after the task and gave us insight into each participant's reasoning and their emotional response. 

The following quotes are examples of these reflections:

"I thought I could play it smart, but by halfway through, I was just bluffing to not get caught.” – Interpol Agent
"I didn’t realise how quickly people could just shift. I mean, I had started off cooperative, then stopped trusting anyone to protect myself.” – Forger

Note that the quotes featured in the Turning Points section were also drawn from these post-game reflections.

Conclusion: What the Outcomes Showed

Our negotiation task revealed how ‘ordinary’ negotiators instinctively applied key theories and strategies, highlighting the importance of negotiation and influence education.

We successfully predicted many behaviours, such as the lasting importance of a poor BATNA on leverage and confidence, seen with the Museum Curator. We also correctly anticipated the significant role that threats and emotions would play, with the Curator once again being vulnerable to implied threats, with their distrust preventing early alliances. Emotional exposure further weakened positions, with private alliances forming against the Interpol Agent due to the explosive behaviour and loss of leverage.

However, we were surprised that negotiations began somewhat integrative before shifting to a distributive manner over time. We had predicted negotiations to start reluctantly, with the negotiators gradually forming alliances. But we underestimated how initial interactions, driven by a need for security and trust, encouraged a more cooperative early phase.

Overall, this blog has shown that those unfamiliar with negotiation theory tend to rely on instinct and social cues, making them more prone to mistakes and emotional influence. This contributes to and explains the unpredictable nature of negotiations at all levels, from everyday disputes to international diplomacy.

Thank you for reading our blog post – we hope it has demonstrated the importance of studying negotiation and influence for success in everyday interactions.

 

 

 
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